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Notions of the “learner” and “liberal education” in a “Graduation Program” re-
cently published by British Columbia’s Ministry of Education deserve a critique.
Charles Taylor argues that Western practices and institutions support notions of
self-identity that are, in turn, reformulations of Lockean and Rousseauian views
of the moral life. I make three points. First, the Graduation Program uncritically
incorporates versions of both ethics in its description of the learner. Second, in
their discussion of curriculum organization and implementation, the authors aban-
don the Rousseauian view and present a weak utilitarian account of the graduat-
ing pupil. And third, although the latter conception might be economically or
politically useful, it is educationally fatuous, especially in light of the authors’
claim that they propose “a sound, broad, and basic liberal education.” I argue that
a good liberal curriculum ought primarily to produce sophisticated conversation-
alists.
Les notions de “learner” et de “liberal education” dans un “Graduation Program”
qui apparaissent dans une publication récente du ministère de l’Éducation de la
Colombie-Britannique méritent une critique. Charles Taylor affirme que les mé-
thodes et institutions occidentales appuient des notions d’“auto-identité” qui sont,
à leur tour, des reformulations des points de vue lockiens et rousseauistes de la
vie morale. L’auteur apporte trois points. D’abord, le “Graduation Program”
incorpore sans critique des versions des deux éthiques dans sa description de
l’apprenant. Deuxièmement, dans leur discussion de l’organisation et de l’im-
plantation du curriculum, les auteurs abandonnent le point de vue de Rousseau
et présentent un faible compte rendu utilitaire de l’élève promu. Troisièmement,
bien que cette dernière conception puisse être économiquement ou politiquement
utile, elle est absurde d’un point de vue éducatif, surtout à la lumière du fait que
les auteurs prétendent proposer “une éducation libérale de base, vaste et solide.”
L’auteur soutient qu’un bon curriculum libéral devrait surtout produire des per-
sonnes qui ont l’art de la conversation.
In The Dialectic of Freedom, Maxine Greene (1988) expresses profound
alarm at the modern cry for freedom, a cry she believes inane because
unsituated, that is, because it refutes history and solidarity, and extols pure
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self-autonomy. Paradoxically, she observes, the cry is typically uttered by
those “anchored or submerged” by all that is perfectly natural in their lives,
by the very certainty of this reality they inhabit. Greene seeks therefore to
recover and affirm “the relation between subject and object, individual and
environment, self and society, outsider and community, living consciousness
and phenomenal world” (p. 8).
In her introduction, Greene describes the “deeply public” character of her
various literary and educational studies. The Dialectic of Freedom, she
writes, “arises out of a lifetime’s preoccupation with quest,” and has, to a
great extent, involved a deliberate effort “to connect the undertaking of
education . . . to the making and remaking of a public space, a space of
dialogue and possibility” (p. xi). Educationalists, she argues, ought to
enkindle learners’ curiosity, enlarge their capacity for inquiring into the
commonsensical, the givenness of their lives. Teachers ought to be princi-
pally concerned with initiating pupils into a fruitful, productive, yet critical
conversation with their life-worlds.
In what follows, I, too, undertake an educational quest of sorts, similar
in kind to Greene’s. I want to identify and criticize notions of the “learner”
and the “liberal school” presented in the secondary education curriculum
recently drafted by British Columbia’s Ministry of Education (1990a;
hereafter, the “GP” document).1 More precisely, I’ll indicate how this reform
document mistakenly conceives the “pupil” to be a consummate strategist,
a rugged, spirited individualist, self-disciplined, self-contained, organized,
and ambitious to a fault. Further, I’ll argue that although the conception
might be economically or politically useful, it is educationally fatuous: a
liberal education does not entail producing thousands of independent-minded
strategists. The final section of this essay is concerned therefore with
outlining an expressivist conception of the “pupil.” Drawing on Michael




The purpose of the British Columbia School system is to enable learners to
develop their individual potential and to acquire the knowledge, skills, and
attitudes needed to contribute to a healthy society and a prosperous and sustain-
able economy. (GP, p. 7)
This mission statement implies that the reform program will serve two
“needs”: those of individual students and the social-economic “needs” of
provincial and national communities. On first view, this is uncontentious
because so obviously true, so commonsensical. Schools ought to sustain and
promote individual flourishing and concurrently, inculcate in the young
person the character and virtue of a prosperous “citizenship.”
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On second thought, however, one queries the authors’ use of certain
words and phrases. For instance, what “individual potential” do the authors
wish to see actualized? And further, in light of this educational imperative,
what significance do the terms “healthy society” or “prosperous and sustain-
able economy” have for them?
In the Western intellectual tradition, the question of how best to fulfil the
private longings of human subjects and still properly satisfy the “needs” of
their communities has been long and furiously debated. In the contemporary
world, this remains a basic moral-political dilemma to which there is no
correct solution, just congeries of polemical ones.
Nonetheless, I think it’s legitimate to ask whether the authors of the GP
document have a sufficient or even the barest understanding of this debate
and how it influences their views on the nature of learning or the purposes
of liberal schooling. Put otherwise: do the authors more or less grasp the
normative presuppositions underlying their educational mission?
It is my premise that they do not. I suggest the mission statement is the
first in a series describing the nature of the “educated citizen” showing that
the authors are of two minds, ethically speaking. More precisely, the reform
document presents us with two conflicting versions of the “learner,” versions
that may be most aptly termed “romantic” and “utilitarian.” But, of course,
how do I use these terms? By way of explanation, I’ll draw on Charles
Taylor’s (1985b, 1989) studies of the “making of modern identities.”3
According to Taylor, a new, modern self-understanding emerges in
seventeenth-century notions of the religious life. In the work of John Locke,
for instance, one observes a “modern Christian consciousness” heralding the
majesty and sovereignty of God and arguing thereby that the truly human
life is that which has accurately discerned His purposes. For Locke, the
solitary pursuit of the human person, the autonomy of the self, is of para-
mount importance in any authentically Christian life. Nonetheless, the
personal endeavour to grasp lucidly God’s intentions and then enact them
obliges the individual to dwell in human community. The reasonable man
understands his Christian responsibility is to conjoin with others and to
“acquire through labour” the good, holy life here on earth.
Further, we find in the Calvinist doctrine a strong affirmation of the
sanctity of everyday life. For instance, Taylor observes, the Reformation
abjures the Catholic notion of the extraordinary, blessed life of the celibate
priest because that notion implies that ordinary existence, the common world
of marriage and family, is not as worthy in God’s eyes. “The sanctified
ordinary life is a spiritual condition,” declare the reformers (p. 268); truly
religious individuals must struggle arduously to live their lives in society as
God deems they ought to be lived. Persons must be disciplined and deliber-
ate in their actions and “engage the peculiar excellence” of their particular
kind of being, the excellence of God-given, human reason.
In other words, Taylor argues, this version of intrinsic human nature
highlights the importance of rational control. What is more, it does not extol
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human desires and urges; rather, it considers them to be indistinguishable
generally from the base instincts of other animate beings. Writes Taylor,
“what is humanly satisfying about this life is not just that natural impulses
are fulfilled, but that men in doing so are exercising their reason and
affirming their autonomy. . . . This is life according to nature, in its first
version, as it emerges in modern society” (p. 265).
This early conception of the utilitarian self therefore esteems a purposive
rationality, the kind of reasoning enabling individuals to effect what they
will, and moreover, to see “the things around [them] as potentially raw
material for [their] purposes” (p. 267). Consequently, the world’s particulars
are dispossessed of the intrinsic value they were seen to have in ancient and
medieval cosmologies: they are useful for our purposes and our purposes
alone. The rational animal effectively becomes a co-creator, an enterprising
partner in God’s worldly venture.
Still, to Reform intellectuals, the “efficacy” of this kind of thought and
action was not all that mattered (though it mattered tremendously). Of
utmost importance to them was that their labours bore fruit: therein lay the
true evidence of their autonomy, the freedom, as Taylor puts it, from
“superstition and imposture” (p. 267). The very success of their instrumental
stance indicated they had properly discerned God’s spiritual ambitions.
A second version of the good inward life, says Taylor, appears later in
the eighteenth century, most especially in the writings of Rousseau. The
French philosopher is one of the first to argue suasively that the virtue or
excellence of human persons “lies in [their] tender and noble sentiments,
which flow from an undistorted or unsullied nature” (p. 269). The emphasis
here is upon discerning the essence of our humanity rather than employing
our faculty of reason effectively to satisfy our desires. Briefly, in stark
contrast to the utilitarian, the romantic seeks to distinguish the good, human
urges from the bad. As Taylor writes, Rousseau is most concerned with
elucidating the quality of human motivations. He supposes that “the good
man is moved by the pure voice of consciousness/nature, which truly comes
from him; the bad man by heteronomous passions” (p. 270).
These two versions of “life according to nature” differ, then, in the
following way. According to the utilitarian account, persons ought to
exercise their reason in order to satisfy “the demands of nature, which are of
themselves of no more than de facto worth” (p. 270). It holds in highest
esteem a purposive rationality, a disenchanted attitude, and the control and
autonomy such an instrumental stance provides. Romanticism, in contrast,
believes that persons ought to intuit “the voice of nature, a source of pure,
higher desire” within themselves, in order to live well, that is, to think, act,
and feel in an authentically human way. Thus, it celebrates the virtue of a
truly sentimental existence, and requires individuals reasonably grasp the
essential qualities of their passions.
Still later, the Rousseauian account is adopted and extended by the
Romantic-expressivist movement. Romanticism, Taylor says, comes to
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understand the intuitive journey of the modern self (and “nation”) as one of
both exploration and disclosure. Following Rousseau, the Expressivists
believe each person possesses a unique nature which must be revealed by a
passionate, inward search; but then they take a further, and vitally important,
conceptual step. As Taylor (1985b) writes, on their view, “not only do we
need to turn away from other-dependence and false passion,” we ought as
well to “articulate what we are,” learn to elucidate publicly what we have
individually recovered (p. 272).
Now, given these two views of personhood, what might one say about
the conception of the learner in the GP document?
As I stated earlier, the reform curriculum affirms contradictory moral
views in its mission and goal statements. On the one hand, asserting that the
learner’s “potential” ought to be developed, the authors implicitly appeal to
the reader’s modern belief in the integrity of the individual life, that is, to
our common understanding that the human person is a free subject, a self-
determining creature whose true, noble nature is yet to be revealed. On the
other hand, the mission statement declares schools must help pupils become
productive citizens, that is, acquire the dispositions and abilities that allow
them to contribute economically and socially. Here, at the onset, we may
recognize the significance that the authors attach to romantic and to utili-
tarian values.
The tension is evident later, when the authors declare the principal goal
of schools is to enable students to develop certain intellectual faculties,
namely, the capacities to think and reason independently, creatively, and
expressively, to analyze in a critical manner, to appreciate learning, and to
be curious.4 Again, at first read, such an educational claim stands to our
common sense. Most people admire autonomous, innovative thought and
action, and the childlike propensity unceasingly to explore and to inquire.
Herein lies a tentative answer to the question of what latent abilities in the
learner the authors believe should be developed. This is a plea to allow for
the curiosity and creative aspirations of the person and has a Rousseauian
air.
But the romantic force of this entreaty is diminished by the contrary,
utilitarian call for “experiences” that would enable pupils to become more
efficacious. That is, the authors say they want individuals to become more
decisive, independent-minded, and strategic in their learning. Moreover, the
reform curriculum will afford them the opportunities to enhance and extend
their communication skills, to “exhibit self-motivation and self-direction,” to
evaluate, to assess, to be selective about their learning; in sum, students will
have several chances to develop a procedural rationality and thereby ensure
the success of their own educational practices and pursuits.5
The authors’ educational targets for the pupil are all well and good. To
support purposeful, fruitful inquiries is reasonable and educationally desir-
able. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that individual autonomy and
exploration is only recognizable because it is “situated,” that is to say, the
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expressions and actions any community holds in high regard, always
express—and are actions taken in light of—certain good(s). Hence the
importance of asking what the authors mean precisely when they claim the
GP will provide “experiences” that compel learners to think, to reason, and
to act “independently”. What things will learners be thinking about—how
best to compete in a fast changing world or why competition is so highly
esteemed in a modern industrial society, how to be autonomous and self-
reliant or what purposes are best served by independent-minded people? In
short, what “experiences” which draw out, or help to actualize the individu-
al’s potential? Does emphasis on procedural knowledge support the learner’s
romantic exploration of the world? Moreover, what kinds of learning will
pupils come to “appreciate,” and how will they express themselves after
following this curriculum?
Despite this first elaboration of the mission statement, one remains
uncertain as to the reasonableness and coherence of the program goals. Up
until this point in the document, the authors have only provided us with an
extensive, rather meaningless, set of “descriptors” for what might be termed
the “educated-citizen-to-be” or graduate learner.6 At this early, crucial stage
in their discussions, the authors consistently fail to explain the significance
of the terms they employ to characterize learning at this stage. Put other-
wise: they do not critically recognize or understand the conflicting notions
of the modern identity with which they work and hence display a certain
moral ambivalence in their account of the “pupil.” Do the authors mean to
express a romantic or utilitarian conception of learning (or perhaps an
original synthesis of the two)? One cannot tell, at least at this juncture.
THE ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GRADUATION PROGRAM
Is the authors’ educational stance more coherent in the later sections? Let’s
examine the practical organization of what the authors term a “broad liberal
education that contributes to [students’] development as educated citizens”
(GP, p. 17). Moreover, let us consider in what ways this general, liberal
focus will be complemented by “activities that relate more specifically to the
[learners’] own personal post-graduation endeavours” (GP, p. 17).
First of all, the authors state, if you want to produce educated citizens,
then you must engage students in a general, but critical, study of the ardu-
ous, challenging, and responsible task of living in a plurality of commun-
ities.7 Such an endeavour means grasping the “big picture.” This refers to
the compelling, often invigorating business of learning what a healthy
society is and how one’s personal life can help to sustain and perhaps
improve it. The ideally educated citizen comprehends, and is able to adapt
to, the “demands and expectations of a changing world.” Hence, the learner
will become adept at organizing, assessing, and communicating what she
knows. She will learn to produce things needed in the everyday world. Her
studies will motivate, instilling in her a deep sense of security, confidence,
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and trust. Further, they will enable her to become decisive, and teach her
profoundly to respect herself and others.
Second, the authors believe a broad, liberal education is properly “a
system of plurality of excellence” that will ideally offer the learner “a
variety of career paths”; hence, their curriculum will permit the learner to
enter “programs that are different in kind but equal in status” (GP, p. 23). In
practical terms, the GP document describes five paths or options the learner
can take: Exploration, Passport to Apprenticeship (PApp), Career Preparation
(CP), Community-School Partnership (CSP), and University.
And what might one say about these selected options, these courses of
educational conduct, and the premises from which they are derived?
Three of the five options offered to learners in order that they might
prepare a “broad, yet unique” and “liberal” course of study are vocational:
the PApp, CP, and CSP. These three options are preparatory courses,
training exercises in the art of productive citizenry, and serve only to
prepare individuals with particular marketable skills and particular economic
desires. As the authors assure us, there are several career advantages for
learners who choose these pathways.8 But these three are not “liberal” paths
of education in the sense that they encourage learners to follow a rarely
trodden, that is, idiosyncratic course of educational studies. They are more
aptly termed learning fast-tracks to socially appropriate, economically useful
vocations.
What is worse, the remaining two paths, the University and Exploration,
also slant in this direction. For instance, Jin-Ah9 epitomizes the highly
skilled careerist. Her “very full day” is successful, and hence morally
significant, the authors imply, because she is organized, decisive, self-
directed, and efficacious in her efforts to become an ethnomusicologist.
Again, the authors claim that Robert10 is exploring when, after consulting his
school “profile” with his counsellor, he decides to coach a school basketball
team and prepare a “fitness programme for seniors at a local retirement
centre” (GP, p. 25). Robert’s educational choices follow, however, from his
being “told” by a career inventory that he would “make a good teacher or
recreational director.”11
The major intent of the curriculum is to instruct pupils how to perform
skilfully, rationally, and successfully in the public world. But is this a liberal
curriculum? I think not. We have been presented with a vision of learner-as-
entrepreneur and asked to agree that secondary education ought to be cen-
trally concerned with ensuring pupils become socialized in the business of
life. Education to some extent always involves this kind of socialization. But
it is wrong to assume, as the authors do, that because “developing career
objectives is a prime focus for most students in their graduation years” (GP,
p. 50), educationalists ought to cater to this interest. It is wrong, too, for the
authors to state baldly that because we are “living in the midst of monumen-
tal changes,”12 it is in educationalists’ interest intellectually to prepare
“educated citizens” who are consummate strategists, capable producers in a
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rapidly changing world. The authors in no way adequately defend their
claim that training individuals for professional careers ought to be a funda-
mental purpose of any liberal education. One could agree that the develop-
ment of other abilities and competencies besides those linguistic and math-
ematical ought to be recognized and encouraged. But should a truly broad
and liberal program of study deliberately set out to prepare students for
specific kinds of careers? It does not follow that a truly broad and liberal
“system of plurality of excellence” would have as one of its principal goals
to prepare students for specific kinds of careers, to produce entrepreneurial
citizens.
Further, the authors propose five options they claim are “different in kind
but equal in status” (p. 23). But can these three career options offer the
kinds of learning a properly liberal curriculum would promote? I suggest
not. As presented here, the three are strongly utilitarian in character and it
is likely that they would ordinarily produce individuals quite indifferent to
what others have to think, feel, or do—unless, of course, the actions or
dispositions of these others might be effectively utilized. As I’ve observed
above, even the exemplary learner described in the University option is a
woman of purpose. Jin-Ah is so tremendously composed, has such rational
control over her life and desires, one doubts whether she would ever be
inclined to playfully converse with, or lovingly address, another person.
Jin-Ah’s actions may be purposeful, but are they wise? The intellectual
freedom of this educated citizen seem quite unsituated; it utterly lacks the
affective human character one cherishes and might reasonably expect to be
encouraged in a properly liberal curriculum.13 Where is the “community of
possibility” inhabited by open-minded, curious, and imaginative learners
envisioned by the authors of the Intermediate Program document?14
Indeed, one might consider all five options equal in status because
similar in kind. Each has its origin in the undefended proposition that career
development is an “integral part” of any truly broad, liberal education (GP,
p. 50). All are expressly concerned therefore with initiating students into
vocational ways of life. Is it reasonable to call this educational develop-
ment?
My final point is this. The vision of the school as a community of possi-
bilities is compelling, but cannot be realized in the ways the authors of the
GP document suggest. An individual will have intentional literacy only if
she is properly engaged in educationally useful communication.15 It is thus
unsettling to hear the authors claim their prescription for a new curriculum
follows from this vision. As presented in the GP document, the goals of the
reform initiative are educational slogans, an item-by-item record of popular
expressions about teaching and learning; the authors provide no coherent
notion of the learner. We are informed, for instance, that the learner will be
taught among other things how to “critically think and reason,” to “com-
municate effectively” and “learn independently”: to echo the authors’ jargon,
we have been merely presented with a list of “descriptors.” But what links
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are there between critical thought and creative expression, between the
ability to learn independently and the capacity to communicate effectively,
between self-understanding and the public spaces of human discourse and
action?
To pursue these questions would be to see schools as communities of
possibilities, to comprehend the practical significance of the claim that
General Studies must have as one of its primary aims the development of
“literacy and communication skills.” Is the literate, educated person best
conceived as a skilled thinker and doer? Do the authors see a difference
between communication skills and communicative abilities or capacities,
between, for instance, learning the explicit rules of language use and the
fluent, everyday speaking of that language? How should we understand the
educational significance of the phrase “the learner will be offered experi-
ences that will enable [her or him] to ‘synthesize imagination, intellect, and
emotion’ ” (GP, p. 10) in light of the earlier statement that learners will be
asked to think and reason critically? Are these so-called “intellectual”
activities connected? How might they be socially constituted, that is, initi-
ated and sustained through the partnership of student and other?
* * *
A person’s self-understanding and ideal education flourish only if the person
learns freely and critically to express herself in speech and other forms of
symbolic action. Pupils ought to be seen as emerging, well-educated conver-
sationalists. My account of “conversation” and its significance in education
draws on the works of Michael Oakeshott, the political philosopher.16
In “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” Oakeshott
(1962) claims that “Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the
skill and partnership of [an historical] conversation in which we learn to
recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in
which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversa-
tion” (p. 199). In our lifetimes, each of us is afforded countless opportunities
to learn something about a cultural conversation “begun in the primeval
forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of the cen-
turies.” Furthermore, Oakeshott says, by carefully “listening” to this “con-
versation of mankind,” we will comprehend how vital it is that all contribute
something of themselves to it (p. 199).
But what is this “conversation of mankind”? It is, Oakeshott says, a
“meeting-place” for “diverse idioms of utterance,” or “various modes of
imagining,” the most “familiar,” authentic, and enduring of these being the
poetic, scientific, moral, and practical. A plurality of voices marks civilizing
conversations. “[Conversation] is impossible in the absence of a diversity of
voices: in it different universes of discourses meet, acknowledge each other
and enjoy an oblique relationship which neither requires nor forecasts their
being assimilated to one another” (pp. 198 – 199). Each voice represents “an
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emancipation” from the prejudices, the limited “considerabilities,” of the
others; it is crucial that none falls into disrepute or becomes reified as the
exemplary mode of speech and deed. If any one voice predominates, the
excellences of our speech communities, the humanizing capacity symbolical-
ly to articulate, to maintain, and to remake ourselves through a diversity of
familiar and unfamiliar voices, will be severely constrained if not disabled.
Oakeshott studies poetic utterance because of the popular, contemporary,
and “barbaric” fascination with the “voice of argumentative discourse, the
voice of science,” and the voice of “practical activity.” Our preoccupation
with these eristic and instrumental voices threatens to undermine the conver-
sation itself, writes Oakeshott (1962), quite simply because each tends
toward “superbia, that is, an exclusive concern with its own utterance, which
may result in its identifying the conversation with itself and its speaking as
if it were speaking only to itself” (p. 201).
To resist the oppressive authority of the voice of science, Oakeshott
redescribes the “quality and significance” of a human activity he says has
long been dismissed as a kind of nonsensical “entertainment” offered during
the “intervals of a more serious discussion”: the activity of contemplative
imagining, or the fashioning and refashioning of poetic images. Oakeshott
thinks poetic imagining is disdained because it lacks intentionality. It is, he
explains, an activity remarkable for the absence of inference or argument,
and for its indifference to matters of fact or illusion, to queries about useful
or good means and ends. Briefly, poetic expressions exhibit no desiring,
willing, or judging subject as do the voices of science and practical activity.
“Since there is no problem to be solved, no hypothesis to be explored, no
restlessness to be overcome, no desire to be satisfied, or approval to be won,
there is no “This, therefore That,” no passage from image to image in which
each movement is a step in an elucidation or in the execution of a project”
(p. 221). So the voice of poetry does not morally guide us, or help us to
discern “facts” and “non-facts,” nor does it represent something like “the
beautiful” to us, or serve some utilitarian desire.
How is this “non-laborious” amoral voice ever distinguished from
“partners of so different [and privileged] a character” as science and practi-
cal activity? The greater part of our everyday lives, admits Oakeshott, is full
of practical concerns and relations; we have numerous obligations and duties
to fulfil, responsibilities to be met. We are typically producers and consum-
ers, managers and workers, and thus preoccupied and oftentimes burdened
by certain interests, beliefs, and anxieties. Nevertheless, “there are relation-
ships, still unmistakably practical, where this is not so. It is not so, for
example, in love and friendship” (p. 244). The image we carry of love and
friendship is “dramatic, not utilitarian,” he argues, and thus provides us a
sense of the freedom which characterizes poetic utterances. Further, if
authentically lived out, these relations display no moral judgement; they are
remarkable for acknowledging the individual character of those loved, the
uniqueness of the selves disclosed through them.
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And what is learning, on his account? He writes: “the necessary condi-
tion of all that distinguishes a human being is that it must be learned.” That
is, we do not naturally possess a human character at birth but rather acquire
it through our learning: “the expression “human nature” stands only for our
common and inescapable engagement: to become by learning” (1989, p. 20).
Thus, the quality and substance of our self-understandings depends entirely
upon our learning the range of expressive practices recognized in our speech
communities. “We are born and grow up in a world of ideas already present
and understood in various ways by those preceding us on the scene, and we
must learn its features, interpret them and appropriate them to ourselves”
(pp. 6–7). In sum, a “human self” only properly appears, is recognized and
engaged as such by other selves, in the activity of shared expressions or
imaginings. Furthermore, the behaviours or activities of any imagining self
may be distinguished as an assemblage of voices, a unique embodiment, you
might say, of the “specific modes” of language use Oakeshott has identified.
In becoming conversant then, pupils are not just socialized to a practical
world, that is, quite skilled in performing a certain range of tasks and thus
useful citizens to their society. Neither have they gained what some laud as
a “general” education; conversationalists are not merely independent think-
ers, able to think logically or deliberatively about something or someone;
they are not simply courageous, patient, careful, or determined persons able
as well “to read attentively and to speak lucidly.” Rather, conversationalists
are those most able to “recognize and discriminate” between the several
voices, the “distinct and conditional . . . idioms of human self-understand-
ing,” found in the world, and more importantly still, those able to elucidate
what they know “in terms of what it means” to them (emphasis in the orig-
inal; pp. 38, 23).
Oakeshott hopes therefore that “we may recognize liberal learning as,
above all else, an education in imagination, an initiation into the art of this
conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices; to distinguish their
different modes of utterance, to acquire the intellectual and moral habits
appropriate to this conversational relationship and thus to make our début
dans la vie humaine” (p. 39). Paradoxical though it might seem, on this
expressivist view, schools ought to be places where pupils learn how to
author themselves even as they submit to the authority of their cultural
traditions.17
Finally, Oakeshott believes the character of liberal teaching is implied by
the character of learning. If pupils are to participate fully in the “great
intellectual adventures” of humankind, then teachers must be capable of
describing those adventures in provocative, engaging ways, in ways that
“communicate something to [a] partner” rather than merely instruct or
inform an “unfurnished mind” in the appropriate ways of living. Thus, the
act of communication has two fundamental aspects: “instructing” or the
communication of information, and “imparting” or the communication of
judgement. So teachers must, on the one hand, convey “information” or the
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“explicit, impersonal, useful ingredient” of human knowledge in order for
the student to develop substantial skills or abilities. On the other hand, they
must comprehend that this “ingredient of information . . . never constitutes
the whole of what we know. Before any concrete skill or ability can appear,
information must be partnered by “judgement,” “knowing how” must be
added to the “knowing what” of information” (p. 53). All genuine knowl-
edge of the world includes an element of both information and judgement.
To sum up: if she sincerely understands the responsibilities of her task,
the liberal teacher will engage her pupils’ imaginations by offering them
particular, remarkable ways of human acting, speaking, or thinking, ways “in
which human beings have sought to identify and to understand themselves,”
and thereby, help them become “inhabitants of a world composed, not of
‘things,’ but of meanings” (pp. 26, 64). In short, the good liberal teacher is
aware of the contingency of her self-understandings, of the oblique way
judgement is conveyed in the event of communicating some small part of
what it means to live humanely. Most especially, she will befriend her
students, helping them to listen, to ask, and to imagine with hope and desire.
* * *
I follow Oakeshott in asserting that a proper education ought to be con-
cerned with enabling pupils to speak reasonably, that is, express themselves
in the traditional “idioms” of our culture. But I go one step further in
claiming that, ideally, sophisticated conversationalists are able as well to
communicate their self-understandings, visually and kinaesthetically, in a
variety of non-linguistic ways. To paraphrase Nelson Goodman (1978),
pupils ought to acquire more or less three “ways of worldmaking,” the oral,
the visual, and the kinesthetic—a good curriculum will enable them intelli-
gently to map time and space in these alternative ways.
In suggesting that well-educated persons are essentially sophisticated
conversationalists, I am not solely concerned with the development of
linguistic abilities in the narrow sense that such persons demonstrate an
excellence in talking about things which matter to them. Rather, I suggest
the excellence of conversationalists is revealed by their capacity to recognize
and to articulate both new thoughts and feelings through a variety of
symbolic activities. Hence, a well-educated person is not merely (or remark-
ably) someone whose intelligence is expressed verbally; for instance, she
might not only be very adept philosophically but in addition, versed in
symbolizing her self-understanding as carpenter, parent, or accountant.18
On this expressivist view, to be properly educated, young persons must
be first carefully and deliberately drawn into different kinds of communicat-
ive action and thereby learn both how to express themselves and be expres-
sed as well.19 The primacy of the dialogical means that when a person
speaks to another and is heard and humanly answered, they are spoken, or
symbolically impressed and informed: the meaning of what I say, and of
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what you say, is revealed in what is between us; to echo Greene (1988), in
the “making and remaking of a public space,” we disclose a freedom that is
ours.
Finally, in these several symbolic engagements, young persons may be
guided toward what I call an intentional literacy. That is to say, proper
educational conversations will enable them existentially to realize, to
practise, and to play out what the theologian Martin Buber (1965) has
termed the principle of any human life—the twofold movement of distance
and relation.
Briefly, in acquiring a first language persons become, to a certain extent,
reflectively aware of the symbols they are using. Each of us can embody
what she knows in varying degrees, to use fluently20 a particular language to
inform our experiences, and we are more or less conscious of our informing
abilities. We all develop, in short, a primary literacy, a customary way of
speaking our selves in a particular community. But although this first
language, or form of life, permits reflective awareness, it confines us to its
range of speech forms, partial standpoints, modes of distance, and relation.
To speak, and thus to think, in any given language community means we are
able expressively to range over a fairly well-defined or circumscribed sym-
bolic territory. But we tend not to go further. As Taylor’s studies (1985a,
1989) of the “pre-modern” self make clear, one’s self-understanding/identity
appears to all intents and purposes to be outwardly derived: the authority of
the individual life solely emerges from an external horizon of meaning.
In contrast to this primary literacy is the critical self-understanding
acquired by learning other language forms. By learning how to thicken the
distance between self and the life world, we come symbolically to trace an
inward journey. Becoming critically fluent means one gains the intellectual-
affective abilities that permit a more or less disenchanted view, an “outlaw”
understanding, of the language world one had previously inhabited (or
acquired the habits of). In effect, one develops the objectifying intelligence
of a discerning subjectivity; one gains an intentional literacy. As Buber
(1965) contends, this objective knowledge is essential if the person is to
properly realize herself in relation; this movement into distance presupposes
(though it does not guarantee) the re-cognition of association and therefore
sets the stage for transforming the realm of customary life into a world of
human being, a community of ethical/political possibilities. Obviously, this
kind of learning has its dangers: one may actually forget that a secondary
literacy is itself just another language form and thus cannot provide a
perfectly ahistorical view, is nothing less than a provisional understanding
of one’s world. One may become an ideologue, a devotee of a particular
critical language, and neglect or refuse to place into question their own
speech forms.
Schools ought to provide therefore the kinds of communicative action
that produce sophisticated conversationalists. Good curricula will help
persons to discriminate, as Oakeshott (1962) says, the various “distinct and
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conditional idioms . . . of human self-understanding” and free them to invent
or to fashion new, idiosyncratic forms of symbolic expressions in the three
ways I’ve alluded to.
CONCLUSION
An education can rise no higher than the conception of the civilization that
pervades it, gives it substance, and determines its purposes and direction.21
As I’ve argued it, the goals and philosophy of the GP curriculum are not
coherently presented. In their discussion of these matters in the GP docu-
ment, for instance, do the authors mean to express a romantic or utilitarian
conception of the pupil? One cannot tell. Unfortunately, in the end, when
they explain how it will be organized and implemented, it becomes apparent
that the GP is intended to serve particular, fairly utilitarian ends that are not
of central interest to what I would call a liberal educationalist. By way of
response, drawing on the educational studies of Michael Oakeshott, I’ve
suggested a good curriculum will be concerned with initiating and sustaining
certain kinds of communicative action, or expressive practices.
My expressivist views are not refashioned romantic ones. My disparaging
of the entrepreneurial turn in this curriculum is not intended to return us to
romance (by the way of default). I believe a fully-fledged romantic under-
standing of the learner is unjustifiable if for no other reason than its hostility
towards any version of the utilitarian ethic—an ethic that strongly appeals
to most of us because it properly recognizes, is quite unashamed by, the
technological accomplishments, or more basically, the material successes of
human labour. I resist, therefore, romantic conceptions of learning that seem
too high-minded, edge towards pure aestheticism. In this regard, educational
theorists and practitioners alike would do well to remember Virginia
Woolf’s impassioned plea in Three Guineas for “a ‘clean-cut’ language that
addresses persons rather than aggregates,” and disrupts “the dance around
‘the poison tree of intellectual harlotry’ ” (quoted in Greene, 1990, p. 71). Or
Amy Gutmann’s (1987) observation that “those among us who would assert
their commitment to civic virtue or to individual freedom at the expense of
denying the legitimacy of the other value” plead for an undemocratic educa-
tion.
I’ve claimed pupils should develop an intentional literacy, becoming
quite able, and not merely skilled, in speaking their world and in hearing
themselves variously spoken or addressed. Moreover, I’ve suggested one
does not acquire this ability in the final run, one learns it. An intentional
literacy comes through education, not instruction. Certainly, literacy includes
acquisition of words and grammatical devices and is a matter of becoming
talented in the use or tooling of common language forms, in being properly
instructed in how to put a sentence, or a kind of thought. But an intentional
literacy is realized only after pupils have acquired a range of expressive
habits and learned how to judge the forms of symbolic action they inhabit;
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in other words, literate persons deliberately recognize what they mean to
communicate. This is a “capacity” only properly learnt in an acknowledged
community of possibilities, in the public space where one is led to com-
municate in diverse, fairly prescribed ways, through a range of symbolic
devices. The public school ought to be such a place: that would be its
principal function.
NOTES
1 A part of the B.C. Government’s “Year 2000” curriculum reform project
begun in 1989, the GP “response draft” prescribes the learner’s final years in
the B.C. public school system (grades 11–12).
The “Year 2000” project includes two other “response draft” programs—the
Primary (K–3) and Intermediate (4–10). In 1990, having solicited critical
replies from a variety of interested parties, the Ministry of Education pub-
lished a revised edition of the Primary curriculum and shortly thereafter, began
implementing it in schools. Second drafts of the Intermediate and Graduation
programs are forthcoming in 1992.
As a whole, the reform curriculum is avowedly “learner-focused,” aiming to
recognize, to sustain, and to enlarge each individual’s means of learning. That
is, the authors claim “active learning” only occurs if and when curriculum
materials and methods of assessment take into account the individual’s devel-
opmental level, abilities, and interests.
2 I use the term “conversationalist” in a very broad sense here. Ideally educated
persons are able to communicate in various ways with other persons. To
borrow Nelson Goodman’s expression, such persons know three “ways of
worldmaking”: the visual, oral, and kinesthetic. They have become quite adept
at using different symbolic forms to map time and space in these three ways.
3 The following discussion is drawn almost entirely from Taylor (1985b). Page
numbers cited in the text are from this work. For a much more thorough
argument, see Taylor (1989).
4 The “primary responsibility” of the school is “to develop the ability of
students to analyze critically, reason and think independently, acquire basic
learning skills and bodies of knowledge; to develop in students a lifelong
appreciation of learning, a curiosity about the world around them, and a
capacity for creative thought and expression” (GP document, p. 8). Further,
the Intermediate Program likens the “world of the learner” to a wide space
between the cultures of the child and adult. The learner here has a wonderlust,
a deep urge to fashion his or her own way of life.
5 Thus, pupils are to learn how to “make considered, effective decisions, select
and apply appropriate learning strategies, self-assessment methods, and evalua-
tion techniques” (GP document, p. 10).
6 The sections on the goals and philosophy of the Graduate Program merely list
the outstanding characteristics of certain educational things; for instance, the
graduate learner is to become “critical” in thought and reason, “communicate
effectively,” he is to become skilled in selecting, applying, assessing, evaluat-
ing, expressing things. But this is like pinpointing the characteristics of a horse
which allow us to designate it a “horse”: “a domesticated perrissodactyl
mammal, Equus caballus, used for draught work and riding” (Collins Diction-
ary, 1979, p. 708) and leaving it at that. My point is this: in giving a con-
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ceptual account of, for instance, “critical appreciation,” one ought to indicate
what one means by the term, treat the reader to a rich conceptual description
of their philosophical concerns or dispositions, rather than merely offer
definitions, slogans. To conceptualize in an educationally useful manner, that
is to say, prescriptively, is not simply a matter of defining something; it is as
well the arduous, crucially important matter of saying why and how one
intends to use these terms.
7 The individual must come to recognize her place, the authors state, “within the
family, the community, Canada, and the world” (GP, p. 19).
8
“Advantages for learners may include the following: qualifying for advance
placement at a post-graduation institution; obtaining advance credit for studies
completed in the local school; acquiring some entry-level employment skills;
obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of the world of work; coming
into contact with potential employers; combining regular graduation with a
specialty focus” (GP, p. 95).
9 Jin-Ah is the authors’ example of the kinds of choices made daily by someone
in the University option. “[Jin-Ah] is a very capable student and plans to
become an ethnomusicologist. Until her severe spinal cord injury four years
ago, she played several instruments and hoped to be a musician for a sym-
phony orchestra. She now has quadriplegia, is in a wheelchair, and is ventila-
tor-dependent. . . . This morning is a very full one! Not only does she have a
test in physics, an in-class assignment in history, and a lab in chemistry, but
at lunch she’s meeting with the grad committee to discuss the ceremonies.
After lunch, she has a quiz in math and in her spare time has a meeting with
the counsellor” (GP, p. 27).
10 Robert is an example of someone who might pursue the Exploration option.
See p. 25 of the GP document.
11 Is good teaching analogous to organizing and directing someone’s leisure
activities?
12 See the Intermediate Program document (British Columbia, Ministry of
Education, 1990b), p. 11.
13 See p. 27 of the GP document. The “very capable” Jin-Ah is frightening
because her actions serve as a means to one particular end. The day in her life
described here seems almost inhuman because it is perfectly planned,
coordinated, structured to ensure she becomes an ethnomusicologist: this is not
an educational adventure, this is akin to a tour of duty. It lacks signs of human
intimacy, care, and compassion.
14 See “The Vision of Schools” in the Intermediate Program document (British
Columbia, Ministry of Education, 1990b), p. 10.
15 See my discussion below for a fuller description of what I mean by intentional
literacy.
16 My discussion draws on Oakeshott (1933, 1962, 1989).
17 The French philosopher, Albert Camus, once remarked in an interview that
“independence is the choosing of one’s own dependencies.”
18 I have in mind here the kind of intelligent, poetic understanding of one’s self
in the world characterized by Robert Pirsig (1972), or in the Buddhist self-
disclosure through gardening, archery, or tea ceremonies. See, for instance,
Herrigel’s Zen and the Art of Archery (1981).
19 This idea hints again at the paradox of the human condition: within any
community of speech, self-expression is both constrained and enabled.
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20 Again, fluency here has both an intellectual and performative sense: when I
speak, I utter embodied words.
21 George Counts, as quoted by Lawrence Cremin (1976), p. 89.
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